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Abstract
This paper studies how Oates’ trade-off between centralized and
decentralized public good provision is affected by changes in house-
holds’ mobility. We show that an increase in household mobility favors
centralization, as it increases competition between jurisdictions in the
decentralized re´gime and accelerates migration to the majority juris-
diction in the centralized re´gime. Our main result is obtained in a
baseline model where jurisdictions first choose taxes, and households
move in response to tax levels. We consider two variants of the model.
If jurisdictions choose public goods rather than tax rates, the equilib-
rium level of public good provision is lower, and mobility again favors
centralization. If jurisdictions maximize total utility rather than res-
ident utility, the equilibrium level of public good provision again de-
creases, and mobility favors centralization when the size of the mobile
population is bounded.
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1 Introduction
Oates (1972) provided an insightful analysis of the trade-off between cen-
tralization and decentralization by contrasting efficient internalization of
inter-jurisdictional spillovers through centralization and efficient matching
of local policies to local tastes through decentralization. This analysis cul-
minated in the celebrated ”Oates’ Decentralization Theorem”, delineating
conditions under which centralized or decentralized provision of public goods
is efficient. Though reminiscent of Tiebout’s (1956) notion of the alignment
of local public goods to local tastes, Oates’ framework did not allow for
mobility of households across jurisdictions. The objective of this paper is
to revisit Oates’ theorem under mobility of households and to investigate
how mobility affects the choice between centralization and decentralization
in the presence of spillovers across jurisdictions.
Since Oates’ original formulation, and particularly since the early 80’s,
there has been a worldwide trend towards fiscal decentralization. An in-
creasing number of public service functions have been devolved to local
governments. Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) provide a synthesis of the
cross-country evidence between 1960 and 1995. For a sample of 48 countries
with populations over 10 million in 1990, they construct a federalism index
every 5 years from 1960 to 1995 and show that the decentralization index
rises from a world average of 1.03 in 1975 to 1.94 by 1995. This global index
covers wide regional disparities, but still shows a significant trend. Using
more recent data on OECD countries, Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2011)
show that the trend has continued between 1990 and 2005, even though
some countries (like the Scandinavian countries) in fact re-centralized over
the period.
Labor mobility has also shown an increasing trend over the last decades.
The European Union is a case at point, since workers can freely move from
one country to the other. Wildasin (2006) notes that several European
nations (like Austria, Belgium, and Germany) have reached gross migration
rates (measuring the sum of inflows and outflows as a percentage of the
population) exceeding 1 percent in 2000 while most other European Union
countries showed gross migration rates between 0.5 and 1 percent. Over the
period 2000-2009, the gross migration rate in Europe has increased, with
Austria, Belgium and Ireland exceeding 2 per cent, and sixteen members of
the European union experiencing gross migration rates over 1%.2
In this paper, we analyze the interplay between household mobility and
fiscal decentralization in a model that preserves the essential features of
Oates’ original formulation. However, following the reinterpretation of fed-
eral policies of Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate (2003), we allow
2Eurostat: Migration and migrant population statistics, October 2011.
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for nonuniform public good provision in the centralized re´gime, and assume
that the choice of public goods derives from a political process in the federal
legislature. We consider a federation formed of two identical jurisdictions,
each of which is initially inhabited by the same number of identical agents.
A fraction of the residents in each jurisdiction are mobile and may move to
the other jurisdiction in response to differences in the public good/taxation
packages of the two jurisdictions, while the remainder are assumed to be im-
mobile. The fraction of mobile agents is taken as an index of mobility, and is
the first basic parameter of the model. Members of one jurisdiction benefit
from the provision of public goods in the other jurisdiction; the extent of
externalities across jurisdictions is measured by a spillover parameter, which
forms the second basic parameter of the model.
The main result of our analysis shows that both higher mobility and
higher spillovers favor centralization, so that one should observe more cen-
tralized provision of local public goods when households are more mobile,
and externalities across jurisdictions increase. While the effect of higher
spillovers on the choice between centralization and decentralization has been
known since Oates (1972), the effect of higher mobility has hitherto not been
emphasized in the literature on fiscal federalism. The intuition underlying
this effect is easy to grasp. An increase in mobility increases competition
between jurisdictions and results in lower public good provision and lower
welfare in the decentralized re´gime.3 In the centralized re´gime, an increase
in mobility accelerates migration to the jurisdiction which holds the major-
ity in the federal legislature, thereby increasing average welfare in society.
Hence, an increase in the fraction of the mobile population results in higher
welfare in the federal re´gime, and lower level in the decentralized re´gime.
The recent trend towards greater household mobility and greater fiscal de-
centralization thus represents an empirical puzzle which does not fit the
intuitions delivered by the theoretical model. In fact, we believe that this
trend reflects a political move towards local governments rather than a care-
ful consideration of the optimal level of government at which public goods
should be provided.
In the baseline model, we consider jurisdictions which simultaneously se-
lect tax rates, after which households move, and the final level of public good
is determined by the population of the two jurisdictions. In this taxation
game, we prove existence of a unique pure strategy symmetric equilibrium.
In the two polar cases of pure public goods and local public goods, surpris-
ingly, mobility does not affect the equilibrium outcome. However, as soon as
3Notice however that this effect of mobility on public good provision only arises when
jurisdictions take into account the effect of their choice of tax/public good packages on
mobility. Hence, in order to capture this effect, we construct a sequential model where
jurisdictions choose their tax/public good package in the first stage, and households move
in the second stage.
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spillovers are neither complete nor absent, the equilibrium level of taxation
and utility in the two jurisdictions is decreasing in the mobility rate. In the
taxation game, spillovers do not have a monotonic impact on equilibrium
tax and public good provision. Public good provision is a U-shaped func-
tion of spillovers, highest in the case of pure and local public goods.4 In the
centralized re´gime, the optimal tax level chosen by the majority jurisdiction
is independent of mobility, as taxes are uniformly levied on all agents irre-
spective of the jurisdiction in which they live. However, mobility affects the
population distribution between the majority jurisdiction (in which public
goods are provided) and the minority jurisdiction, and higher mobility ac-
celerates migration from the minority to the majority jurisdiction, resulting
in higher average social welfare. Hence, our analysis shows that decentral-
ization dominates centralization only when mobility is low and spillovers not
too high. Two examples, using quadratic and linear cost formulations, illus-
trate this result, by highlighting the existence of a decreasing curve linking
spillover and mobility parameters, such that decentralization dominates cen-
tralization below this curve, and centralization dominates decentralization
above.
We test the robustness of our intuitions by considering two variants of
the baseline model. In the first variant, we suppose that jurisdictions choose
public good levels rather than taxes, and that population movements affect
taxes rather than public good levels. In this variant of the model, the ex-
istence of a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium is no longer guaranteed.
However, when a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium exists, it results in
stronger competition and lower public good levels than in the taxation game.
Furthermore, the level of public good is decreasing in both the mobility and
spillover parameters. As the outcome of the centralized re´gime is the same
as in the baseline model, we obtain again that an increase in mobility favors
centralization over decentralization. In the second variant, we assume that
jurisdictions’ objective is to maximize total utility rather than resident util-
ity. When jurisdictions choose taxes, we again prove existence of a unique
pure strategy symmetric equilibrium with lower public good provision than
when jurisdictions maximize resident utility. Spillovers unambiguously re-
duce public good provision, as does an increase in the fraction of the mobile
population. In the centralized re´gime, mobility affects the optimal tax level
of the majority jurisdiction. As the majority jurisdiction cares about the
size of its population, it will increase the tax rate in order to attract more
immigrants. Hence, the effect of an increase in mobility on the welfare in
the centralized re´gime is not as simple as in the case of resident utility. How-
ever, we show that when mobility is not too high, an increase in mobility
4See Lockwood (2008) for other examples where the relation between spillovers and
the choice between centralization and decentralization is sometimes counterintuitive.
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increases average welfare so that our basic intuition on the effect of mobility
on the choice between centralization and decentralization remains valid.
There are a few papers like ours that incorporate mobility of households
into analysis of decentralization versus centralization question in the pres-
ence of externalities. Following Tiebout’s (1956) lead, there is a literature
introducing household mobility into models of fiscal federalism, but those
typically do not involve spillovers across jurisdictions; and there is a litera-
ture that incorporates spillovers, as Oates (1972) did in his original rendering
of the decentralization theorem, that do not consider mobility. (See Epple
and Nachyba (2004) and Boadway and Tremblay, (2011) for surveys of both
strands of the literature.) Besley and Coate (2003) and Janeba and Wilson
(2011) mention the study of Oates’ theorem under household mobility as
an important issue to be addressed. Closest to our analysis are a series of
papers by Wellisch (1993, 1994, 1995) and Hoel and Shapiro (2003, 2004)
and Hoel (2004). Wellisch (1993, 1994, 1995) considers a slightly different
model of mobility, where agents have a linear attachment to their region
of residence, as in de Palma and Papageorgiou (1988) and Mansoorian and
Myers (1993), whereas we suppose that agents have heterogeneous migration
costs. More importantly, Wellisch does not explicitly introduces spillovers
in his analysis, so that his model does not enable him to study how changes
in mobility affect the trade-off between centralization and decentralization.
Hoel and Schapiro (2003, 2004) and Hoel (2004) also analyze the effect of
mobility on local public good provision with spillovers, in a general model
inspired by recent problems of transboundary pollution. Their main result,
echoing earlier results by Boadway (1982) in the case of public goods without
spillovers and Wellisch (1993) for perfectly mobile populations, is that, when
agents are homogeneous, the outcome of the decentralized game of public
provision is always efficient (when the unique equilibrium of the households’
location game is interior). In our model, agents are heterogeneous (and our
analysis is only valid if the support of the mobility cost distribution is large
enough) so that their result does not apply. Hence, our model captures a
situation where decentralized public good provision is not efficient so that
the trade-off between decentralization and centralization of Oates’ Theorem
is meaningful.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model, including a description of decentralization, centralization and welfare
measures for jurisdictions. Section 3 studies in detail the decentralized case
for the two polar cases of pure public goods and local public goods as well
as for arbitrary spillovers. Section 4 presents the centralized solution and
states and proves the main result of the paper, extending Oates’ theorem to
a setting with household mobility. Section 5 looks at variations of the model
for robustness. Section 6 provides a summary of the results and concludes.
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2 The Model
2.1 Public goods, agents and jurisdictions
We consider a federation formed of two identical jurisdictions with a mass of
1 identical agents in each jurisdiction. All agents have an initial endowment
of one unit of private good, which can be transformed into a public good with
a constant returns to scale technology. Each jurisdiction i provides a public
good gi which is financed through a uniform tax τi levied on the agents.
Members of one jurisdiction benefit from the provision of public goods in
the other jurisdiction, through the following spillover mechanism.5 Public
goods provided in the two jurisdictions are perfect substitutes, and a member
of jurisdiction i benefits from the public good provided in jurisdiction j at a
rate α ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, the effective amount of public good consumed by an
agent in jurisdiction i is gi + αgj . As α converges to zero, the public good
becomes a local public good, and as α converges to one, a pure public good.
The utility of an agent in jurisdiction i is thus given by:
Ui = U(gi + αgj , 1− τi). (1)
As in the classical model of Blume, Bergstrom and Varian (1986), we assume
that the utility function U is strictly increasing and concave and that the
public and private goods are normal goods. We denote the marginal utility
with respect to the public good and private goods as Ug and Ue. We also
assume that the public and private goods are complements so that Uge >
0. Each jurisdiction initially comprises a mass of 1 residents. A fraction
λ ∈ [0, 1] of the residents are mobile and may move to the other jurisdiction
in response to differences in the public good/taxation packages of the two
jurisdictions. The remainder mass of 1− λ are immobile. The parameter λ
thus measures the degree of mobility of agents in society, and an increase
in λ is interpreted as an increase in the geographical mobility of economic
agents. In addition, we assume that mobile agents suffer a moving cost if
they move to the other jurisdiction, and that moving costs are distributed
according to a cumulative distribution function F (·) over a compact support
[0,K]. After migration, the new jurisdiction sizes are given by (n1, n2) which
may differ from the original sizes (1, 1).
2.2 Decentralized public good provision
In the decentralized re´gime, the two jurisdictions independently choose their
public good levels g1 and g2 and finance the public good by a tax levied only
5This is the same spillover model as the one studied in Bloch and Zenginobuz (2006)
and (2007).
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on the residents: gi = niτi, so that the utility of an agent in jurisdiction i is
given by:
Ui = U(niτi + αnjτj , 1− τi) = U(gi + αgj , 1− gi
ni
). (2)
In Tiebout (1956)’s original analysis, households’ mobility decisions and
jurisdictions’ choices of public good and taxes are simultaneous: in our
model a Tiebout equilibrium is defined as a vector (n1, n2, g1, g2) such that
1. No agent wants to move given (g1, g2)
2. Jurisdictions choose public goods in order to maximize the utility of
the agents given (n1, n2)
In a symmetric equilibrium of the Tiebout model, n1 = n2 = 1 and jurisdic-
tions choose public good levels g∗ such that
Ug(g
∗(1 + α), 1− g∗) = Ue(g∗(1 + α), 1− g∗) (3)
Hence, because jurisdictions choose tax/public good levels for a fixed juris-
diction structure, equilibrium levels of public goods and utilities are inde-
pendent of the agents’ mobility, and an increase in the mobility parameter
λ does not affect the equilibrium utility of households at a symmetric equi-
librium.6
In order to capture the effect of changes in mobility on the equilibrium
level of public goods and utilities, we thus consider a two-stage model, where
jurisdictions choose a tax rate (or public good level) in the first stage, and
households choose whether to move in the second stage. This two-stage
model is naturally interpreted as a Stackelberg game where jurisdictions
initially propose tax or public good levels and economic agents react by
moving across jurisdictions. When agents are immobile, whether the juris-
diction chooses a public good level or a tax rate is irrelevant. With mobile
agents, the instrument chosen by jurisdictions becomes important. A ju-
risdiction i can either choose the tax rate τi and let the quantity of public
good gi adjust according to the size of the jurisdiction, or fix the public good
level gi and adapt the tax rate to cover the cost of the public good. In the
6In our earlier work (Bloch and Zenginobuz (2006) and (2007)), we analyzed the
Tiebout equilibria of the same model of public good provision with spillovers, but did
not restrict attention to symmetric equilibria. Notice also that the same independence
result obtains if, instead of considering a model of simultaneous mobility and taxation
decisions, we analyzed a model of ”slow” migration where agents choose their jurisdiction
before jurisdictions choose taxation levels (Mitsui and Sato (2001) and Hoel (2004)). As
in the Tiebout model, at a symmetric equilibrium, n1 = n2 = 1, and the equilibrium
choice of jurisdictions g∗ is independent of λ.
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baseline analysis, in order to conform to real local government decision pro-
cesses, we assume that jurisdictions select the tax rate and let the quantity
of public good adjust. We thus solve the taxation game played by the two
jurisdictions.
We also note that, in the mobility game of the second stage, as utilities
depend on the sizes of jurisdictions, coordination failures may arise. Moving
decisions involve coordination among agents of measure zero who individu-
ally have no impact on the outcome of the game. In order to select among
equilibria, we focus attention on the equilibrium where the largest number
of agents moves. This is the only equilibrium which is robust to deviations
by groups of arbitrarily small sizes .7 Finally, we will focus attention on
pure strategy symmetric equilibria in the taxation game played by the two
jurisdictions.
2.3 Centralized public good provision
In Oates (1972)’ original analysis, a central government provides a uniform
level of public goods across jurisdictions, so that the centralized outcome sat-
isfied gi = gj = g and τi = τj = τ . This specification of centralized decision
process imposes unrealistic constraints on the choice of the federation. Re-
visiting Oates original formulation, Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate
(2003) have noted that the important aspect of centralized decision making
is that decisions are made at a single level of government. However, these
decisions may involve different levels of public good provision in different
jurisdictions. Following this reinterpretation of centralized decision making,
we assume that one jurisdiction (the ”majority jurisdiction”) chooses the
levels of public good offered in both jurisdictions, gi and gj .
8 In the federal
re´gime, all agents are subject to the same tax rate τ which is chosen to
satisfy the budget constraint:
gi + gj = 2τ (4)
and the utility of an agent in jurisdiction i is thus given by:
Ui = U(gi + αgj , 1− gi + gj
2
). (5)
Mobile agents move in response to the public good levels in the two
jurisdictions so that the final sizes of jurisdictions, (ni, nj) depend on the
public good decisions made in the federation.
7Je´hiel and Scotchmer (2001) also adopt this refinement to abstract from coordination
failures.
8When the two jurisdictions are of equal size, each one is chosen at random to hold the
majority.
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2.4 Welfare measures for jurisdictions
In order to compute the optimal decisions of jurisdictions in the decentralized
and federal re´gimes, we need to specify the welfare indicator of the jurisdic-
tion. Following Mansoorian and Myers (1997), we note that the result of
the analysis crucially depends on the objective function of the jurisdictions.
In general, we may write the welfare of jurisdiction i as a function of two
criteria: the average utility of residents Ui, and the population size of the
jurisdiction ni:
Wi = W (Ui, ni). (6)
In the baseline analysis, we focus attention on a welfare criterion which only
depends on resident’s utility, Wi = Ui. Alternative specifications include
total utility Wi = Uini, and measures which take into account moving costs
like average utility.9
2.5 Comparing decentralized and centralized provision
As in Oates (1972)’s original analysis, the central question we address is the
following: Under which condition does centralization dominate decentral-
ization? Given the political economy model of centralized decision making
we consider, by a simple revealed preference argument, the welfare level of
the majority jurisdiction is always higher under centralization than decen-
tralization. In order to compare the two re´gimes we thus need to consider
the welfare of residents in both jurisdictions. Assigning an equal weight to
all agents in society, we compute the average resident utility of all agents
in society. As the total population of society is fixed, we specify a social
welfare criterion which only depends on average resident utility:
W =
1
2
(niUi + njUj). (7)
3 Decentralized public good provision
In this Section, we analyze the outcome of the game played by the two
jurisdictions choosing the tax rate. We start the analysis by considering two
polar cases which have been extensively studied in the literature on fiscal
federalism: pure public goods (α = 1) and local public goods (α = 0).
9In the average utility case, W (Ui, ni) is decreasing in population size ni, as average
utility includes moving costs which are increasing in immigration, and hence in the size of
the population. In our view, this assumption is rather unrealistic, and it is hard to argue
that a jurisdiction’s objective should be decreasing in the population size.
8
3.1 Pure public goods
We solve the game by backward induction and consider first the choice of
mobile agents. In the pure public good case, the effective public good level
is the same in both jurisdictions, and agents only care about the tax rate.
For any pair (τ1, τ2),
Ui ≥ Uj ⇔ τi ≤ τj (8)
Without loss of generality, suppose that τ1 ≥ τ2. Migration from juris-
diction 1 to jurisdiction 2 will be characterized by the index of the last agent
to move where x is the solution to the equation:
U(τ1(1− λF (x)) + τ2(1 + λF (x)), 1− τ1) =
U(τ1(1− λF (x)) + τ2(1 + λF (x)), 1− τ2)− x (9)
We may define similarly the migration flow of agents from jurisdiction 2
to jurisdiction 1 when τ2 ≥ τ1. Anticipating the mobility of agents, the two
jurisdictions simultaneously choose tax levels in order to maximize resident
utility. Hence, for any τ2, τ1 is chosen to solve the maximization problem:
max
τ1
1τ1≥τ2U(τ1(1− λF (x)) + τ2(1 + λF (x)), 1− τ1) (10)
+1τ1<τ2U(τ1(1 + λF (x)) + τ2(1− λF (x)), 1− τ1)
Let τ∗ denote the unique equilibrium level of the game played by the two
jurisdictions when agents are immobile, i.e.
Ug(2τ
∗, 1− τ∗) = Ue(2τ∗, 1− τ∗). (11)
Proposition 1 In the pure public goods model, the taxation game played
by the two jurisdictions admits a unique symmetric equilibrium where τ1 =
τ2 = τ
∗.
Proposition 1 characterizes the unique symmetric equilibrium of the
game of taxation. In the pure public good case, mobility has no impact
on the provision of public good by the two jurisdictions. The equilibrium
level of taxation τ∗ is independent of λ, and an increase in agents’ geographic
mobility does not affect the provision of public good and the utility level of
the agents. In order to compare the case of pure public goods with other
situations, we illustrate in Figure 1 the equilibrium level τ∗ and the utility
levels to indicate the direction of migration of agents across jurisdictions for
any possible choice (τ1, τ2).
9
Figure 1: Pure public goods
3.2 Local public goods
When the public good does not produce any externality on the other juris-
diction, the utility of a member of jurisdiction i is given by
Ui(τini, 1− τi).
When agents are immobile, the optimal taxation level for any jurisdiction is
given by τ∗, the solution to the equation
Ug(τ
∗, 1− τ∗) = Ue(τ∗, 1− τ∗). (12)
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Agents’ incentives to move across jurisdictions depends on the deviation
between the optimal tax level τ∗ and the effective tax level τi in the two
jurisdictions. As illustrated in Figure 2, we can describe a locus of distinct
tax rates (τ1, τ2) such that
U(τ1, 1− τ1) = U(τ2, 1− τ2).
Figure 2: Local public goods: comparison of utilities
Furthermore this equation implicitly defines a decreasing function in the
plane (τ1, τ2). Hence, as illustrated in Figure 3, the plane (τ1, τ2) can be
divided into four regions, according to the direction of the migration flow.
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For low levels of τj and moderate levels of τi, and for high values of τj and
moderate values of τi, migration flows from jurisdiction j to jurisdiction i. In
particular, along the diagonal, we see that U1 > U2 if τ1 > τ2 when τ1 < τ
∗
and U2 > U1 if τ1 > τ2 when τ1 > τ
∗.
Figure 3: Local public goods
If U1 < U2, the migration flow from jurisdiction 1 to jurisdiction 2 is
characterized by the index x of the last agent to move:
U(τ1(1− λF (x)), 1− τ1)− x = U(τ2(1 + λF (x)), 1− τ2).
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In a symmetric way, we define the migration flow from jurisdiction 2 to
jurisdiction 1 when U1 > U2. Then, for any τ2, jurisdiction 1 chooses τ1 is
chosen to solve the maximization problem:
max
τ1
1τ1,τ2|U2>U1U(τ1(1− λF (x)), 1− τ1) (13)
+1τ1,τ2|U1>U2U(τ1(1 + λF (x)), 1− τ1)
In the analysis of the local public good case, we need to introduce an ad-
ditional assumption in order to guarantee that migration only occurs in
reaction to differences in taxes and not simply in order to benefit from liv-
ing in a larger jurisdiction. In other words, we suppose that when the two
jurisdictions choose the same tax level, the only equilibrium migration flow
is zero. Hence, for all τ , we want the equation:
U(τ(1− λF (x)), 1− τ)− x = U(τ(1 + λF (x)), 1− τ).
to have a unique solution x = 0. A sufficient condition for this is that the
mapping: U(τ(1−λF (x)), 1− τ)−x−U(τ(1 +λF (x)), 1− τ) be monotonic
in x for all τ . This will be guaranteed by the assumption:
Assumption 1 Suppose that for all x, 2λf(x)Ug(0, 1) < 1.
Assumption 1 places an upper bound on the size of the mobile population,
the marginal utility of the public good at 0 and the rate of change of the
distribution of migration costs. Under this assumption, we show that the
unique equilibrium of the taxation game has both jurisdictions choosing the
tax rate τ∗:
Proposition 2 In the local public goods model, the taxation game played by
the two jurisdictions admits a unique equilibrium, where both jurisdictions
choose the tax rate τ∗.
As in the case of pure public goods, the unique symmetric equilibrium of
the taxation game with local public goods is independent of the mobility of
agents. In equilibrium, both jurisdictions choose the taxation level τ∗, which
would have been chosen even when agents are immobile. As no migration
occurs in equilibrium, the equilibrium utility of all agents is also unaffected
by the mobility parameter λ.
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3.3 Arbitrary spillovers
In this Subsection, we consider public goods generating arbitrary spillovers
parameterized by α ∈ (0, 1). The analysis of the taxation game with ar-
bitrary spillovers is much more complex than the analysis of the two polar
cases of pure public goods and local public goods. When α = 1, members of
both jurisdictions consume the same level of public goods and migrations are
only driven by the level of taxation which affects consumption of the private
good. When α = 0, the utility of the member of one jurisdiction does not
depend on the tax levied in the other jurisdiction. With arbitrary values of
the spillover parameter, the utility of a resident of one jurisdiction is affected
by the tax level in the other jurisdiction in a nontrivial way, and the charac-
terization of inter-jurisdictional migrations becomes extremely complex. In
order to keep the analysis tractable, we specialize the model in two ways.
Assumption 2 Assume that utility is quasi-linear in the public good: U(gi+
αgj , 1− τi) = gi+αgj +v(1− τi) where v(·) is strictly increasing and strictly
concave.
Assumption 3 Assume that the distribution of migration costs is uniform,
F (x) = κx, with κ = 1K .
Assumption 2 is a common assumption in the study of noncooperative
games of public good provision across jurisdictions (see for example Ray
and Vohra (2001), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) or Bloch and Zenginobuz
(2007)). It guarantees that the marginal utility of the public good in one
jurisdiction is independent of the strategies chosen in other jurisdictions,
and greatly simplifies the analysis of the game of public good provision. In
our model, this assumption enables us to obtain clear comparative statics
on the effect of changes in the taxation level on migrations. Assumption
3 is an implicit assumption in much of the public economic literature on
inter-jurisdictional migration. (It is for example assumed in all models of
regional attachment.) In our analysis, this assumption is needed because
variations in the density of migration costs greatly complicate the analysis
of the reaction of migration flows to tax levels in the model with arbitrary
spillovers.
Even under the simplifying Assumptions 2 and 3, the analysis of migra-
tion flows as a function of the tax levels (τ1, τ2) is complex. Consider the
formula equating utility in the two jurisdictions:
τ1(1− α) + v(1− τ1) = τ2(1− α) + v(1− τ2) (14)
14
Figure 4: Utility equalization in two jurisdictions
The function τ1(1−α) + v(1− τ1) is non-monotonic in τ1 which implies
that the locus of tax rates (τ1, τ2) which guarantee equal utility in the two
jurisdictions is hard to characterize. Figure 4 maps the function φ(τ1) =
τ1(1 − α) + v(1 − τ1) when τ2 ≤ τ∗. It shows why the arbitrary spillover
case is more complex to analyze than any of the two polar cases α = 0
or α = 1. In the case of pure public goods and local public goods, the
function φ(·) is monotonic over [0, τ∗]. When α is arbitrary, the function
may not be monotonic, so that we may separate the parameter space into
three regions: a region of low values of taxes, [0, τ) for which U2 > U1, a
region of intermediate tax levels (τ , τ) for which U2 > U1, and a region of
high tax levels, (τ , 1] for which U2 > U1. Let x denote the solution to the
linear equation:
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τ1(1−λκx)(1−α) + v(1− τ1) +x = τ2(1 +λκx)(1−α) + v(1− τ2) (15)
If x < 0, migration flows from region 2 to 1 and the migration flow is
−λκmax{K,x} ; if x > 0, migration flows from region 1 to 2 and the migra-
tion flow is λκmax{K,x}. In order to guarantee that x = 0 is the unique
solution of equation 15 for all values τ1 = τ2, we make the following assump-
tion, which generalizes Assumption 1 to arbitrary spillover parameters in
the quasi-linear, uniform model:
Assumption 4 Suppose that 2(1− α)λκ < 1
We now define two specific values of taxes: τ˜ is the tax rate which maximizes
φ(τ), and τ∗ is the equilibrium tax rate in the model with immobile agents:
(1− α) = v′(1− τ˜),
1 = v′(1− τ∗).
Finally, we consider the tax rate τˆ , τ˜ < τˆ < τ∗ which is the unique solution
to the equation:
(1− v′(1− τˆ))− λκ(v′(1− τ)− (1− α))τˆ(1− α) = 0. (16)
Notice that in the two polar cases α = 0 and α = 1, τˆ = τ∗, but for any
other spillover value α ∈ (0, 1), τˆ < τ∗.
Proposition 3 In the quasi-linear, uniform model with arbitrary spillovers,
the taxation game admits a unique symmetric equilibrium, where both juris-
dictions choose the tax level τˆ .
Proposition 3 shows that, for arbitrary spillover levels α ∈ (0, 1), the
equilibrium tax level depends on the mobility parameter λ. An increase in
mobility reduces the equilibrium tax level τˆ . This is an important result, as
it also shows (because τˆ < τ∗ and utility along the diagonal is increasing in
τ < τ∗) that an increase in mobility reduces the resident utility of members
of both jurisdictions in the decentralized re´gime. Figure 5 graphs the tax
levels τ˜ , τˆ and τ∗ for arbitrary spillovers α. Notice that, by contrast, an
increase in the spillover parameter α has an ambiguous effect on the level
of public good provision: the highest levels of public good provision are
obtained for the two polar cases α = 0 and α = 1. As a consequence, it is in
general impossible to sign the effect of an increase in the spillover parameter
on the equilibrium utility of jurisdiction residents.
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The difficulty in the proof of Proposition 3 stems from the fact that in
the game played by jurisdictions, the utility of residents is continuous in the
tax rates but not quasi-concave in the tax rate chosen in their own juris-
diction. Hence, while the existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies is
guaranteed by a direct application of the Glicksberg Theorem, the existence
of a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies is not easy to prove. We use
a constructive proof and show that, even though utility functions are not
quasi-concave, it is always a best response to choose a tax level τˆ when the
other jurisdiction chooses the tax level τˆ .
Figure 5: Arbitrary spillovers
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4 Centralized public good provision and Oates’
Decentralization theorem
4.1 Centralized public good provision
In the centralized re´gime, one of the two jurisdictions (say jurisdiction 1)
is chosen at random to select the public good levels in both jurisdictions.
As public goods are produced using a constant returns to scale technology,
there is no diseconomy of scale in producing any of the public goods, so that
it is optimal for the majority jurisdiction to locate all the public good in its
jurisdiction.10 The solution to this maximization problem is thus given by:
Ug(2τ
o, 1− τ o)− 1
2
(2τ o, 1− τ o) = 0. (17)
The level of public good provided in the federal system is thus always
greater than τ∗ and hence always higher than the public good provided in the
decentralized model. The intuition for this result is very clear. The majority
jurisdiction knows that all agent in the society will contribute to the public
good, so that members of the jurisdiction will only support a fraction of the
cost. This of course gives an incentive to the majority jurisdiction to increase
the level of taxes and public good provision. Notice that the federal level of
taxes and public good is independent of the mobility of agents. Neither the
total taxes levied in the federation nor the provision of public good depend
on the distribution of the population across jurisdictions, so that the utility
of residents in the majority and minority distributions are not affected by
mobility. Finally, note that, as there is a gap between the utility of members
of the two district, migration will occur from the minority to the majority
district, up to the point where:
x = U(2τ o, 1− τ o)− U(2ατ o, 1− τ o).
so that the migration flow is computed as
F (U(2τ o, 1− τ o)− U(2ατ o, 1− τ o)).
4.2 Oates’ decentralization theorem with mobility
We now bring together the analysis of the decentralized and federal re´gimes
to assess how the trade-off identified by Oates is affected by an increase
10By contrast, Besley and Coate (2003) implicitly assume that the technology of public
good provision involves diseconomies of scale, so that the majority jurisdiction optimally
chooses to provide positive amounts of public goods in both jurisdictions.
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in agents’ mobility. In the decentralized re´gime, in the unique symmetric
equilibrium, no migration occurs and the tax level is given by τˆ which is
decreasing with λ. Hence the welfare in the decentralized re´gime is given
by:
WD = U((1 + α)τˆ , 1− τˆ),
with ∂W
D
∂λ < 0. On the other hand, in the centralized re´gime, the tax level
is independent of λ, and the average utility is given by:
WC =
1
2
U(2τ o, 1− τ o) + U(2ατ o, 1− τ o)
+λF (U(2τ o, 1− τ o)− U(2ατ o, 1− τ o))
(U(2τ o, 1− τ o)− U(2ατ o, 1− τ o)).
As members of the majority district receive a higher utility than members
of the minority district, an increase in the mobility parameter λ increases
migration to the district with higher utility, resulting in a higher average
utility. We summarize this discussion in the main Proposition of the paper:
Proposition 4 The difference in average utility between the centralized and
decentralized re´gime, WC −WD, is increasing in the mobility parameter λ.
Proposition 4 shows that in societies where agents are increasingly mo-
bile, more decisions about public goods should be given to the federal level
and less to the local level. This result seemingly contradicts a trend towards
increased decentralization in modern societies. If the increase in geographic
mobility results from a reduction in transportation costs which also affects
externalities across jurisdictions, the case for centralization is strengthened,
as both an increase in α and in λ tilt the balance in favor of centralization.
We now illustrate Proposition 4 by considering two specific examples.
Example 1 (Quadratic costs) Let v(1− τ) = −τ2.
In the decentralized game, the equilibrium level of taxation is given by
τˆ =
λ+ 2− α2λ
4λ(1− α) −
√
(λ+ 2− α2λ)2 − 8λ(1− α)
4λ(1− α) ,
yielding an average utility:
WD = (1 + α)τˆ − τˆ2.
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In the centralized model, the optimal level of taxation is
τ o = 1,
giving an average utility:
WC = α+ 2λ(1− α)2.
Example 2 (Linear costs) Let v(1 − t) = (1 + β)(1 − t) + (1 − β)(t − t)
if t ≤ t, v(1− t) = (1 + β)(1− t) if t ≥ t, with 0 < β < 1.
In this Example, the marginal utility of the private good is constant and
given by 1+β when t ≥ t and 1−β when t ≤ t. In this simple, linear set-up,
we compute the equilibrium tax in the decentralized game as:
τˆ = min{ β
λκ(1− α)(α+ β) , t}.
with equilibrium utilities:
WD = τˆ(α+ β) + 1 + β(1− 2t).
The optimal tax level in the federal system is given by: τ o = 1, with
average equilibrium utilities:
WC = 1 + α+ 2λ(1− α)2.
Figure 6 displays the values of (α, λ) for which WC = WD in the
quadratic case (panel a) and the linear cost case with β = 0.25 and t = 0.5
(panel b). In both cases, the locus for which centralization and decentraliza-
tion are equivalent is a downward sloping curve in the (α, λ) plane. Higher
values of the spillover and mobility parameters correspond to a region where
centralization dominates decentralization. For lower values of α and λ (for
example, when α = λ = 0), decentralization dominates centralization. In
both cases, the map λ(α) is decreasing and concave, but neither property
is necessarily obtained for the general case where the utility of the private
good is an arbitrary increasing, concave function v(·).
5 Robustness and Extensions
In this Section, we analyze the robustness of our main Proposition, by con-
sidering two alternative specifications of the model. In the first variant, we
suppose that jurisdictions select the level of public good rather than the level
of taxation. In the second variant, we suppose that jurisdictions maximize
total utility rather than resident utility. In both cases, we focus on the
quasi-linear model with uniform distribution over mobility costs introduced
in Section 3.3.
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5.1 Public good game
When jurisdictions choose public good levels g1 and g2 rather than tax rates
τ1 and τ2, the analysis of the decentralized model changes, whereas the
analysis of the centralized re´gime remains unaffected. In the non-cooperative
model, the utility of an agent in jurisdiction i is given by:
Ui = gi + αgj + v(1− gi
ni
).
Equalization of utility in the two jurisdictions is equivalent to the condition:
gi(1− α) + v(1− g1) = g2(1− α) + v(1− g2).
This equations is identical to equation 14, (where tax rates are replaced by
public good levels), so that the direction of migration flows is the same in
the public good and taxation games. However, the value of the migration
flows differ. In the public good game, the migration flow x from jurisdiction
1 to jurisdiction 2 is the solution to the non-linear equation:
g1(1− α) + v(1− g1
1− λκx) + x = g2(1− α) + v(1−
g2
1 + λκx
). (18)
In order to guarantee that this solution is unique for any (g1, g2), we make
the following Assumption:
Assumption 5 Suppose that 1 > 2v′(0)λκ
(1+λκ)2+(1−λκ)2
(1+λκ)2(1−λκ)2 .
Next, consider the solution gˆ of the equation:
(1− v′(1− gˆ))− λκgˆv′(1− gˆ)(1 + α− v′(1− gˆ)) = 0. (19)
Proposition 5 In the quasi-linear, uniform model with arbitrary spillovers,
if the local public good game admits a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium,
then both jurisdictions choose the public good level gˆ. Furthermore, the level
of public good provided in the public good game is lower than in the taxation
game, gˆ < τˆ for all α > 0.
Proposition 5 provides a necessary condition that a symmetric pure strat-
egy equilibrium of the public good game must satisfy. It shows that com-
petition among jurisdictions is stronger when they choose public good levels
rather than tax rates, resulting in lower levels of public good provision. As
in the taxation game, an increase in mobility reduces the level of public
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good provision. The basic insights of the previous analysis are preserved:
an increase in mobility makes centralization more likely to be efficient. Fur-
thermore, in contrast to the taxation game, an increase in the spillover
parameter α has a clear effect on public good provision, leading to a lower
level of public good provision. Hence, it is now clear that centralization
dominates decentralization for higher spillover parameters.
Unfortunately, Proposition 5 does not provide a sufficient condition un-
der which a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium exists in the public good
game. As in the taxation game, the difficulty stems from the fact that, once
jurisdictions take into account the effect of their decisions on household mo-
bility, the payoff functions fail to be quasi-concave in own choices. In the
taxation game, the resident utility is linear in the size of the jurisdiction,
allowing for a simpler analysis than in the public good game where resident
utility is non-linear in the size of the jurisdiction.
5.2 Total utility maximization
When jurisdictions maximize total utility, the computations of both the
equilibrium tax in the decentralized game and the optimal tax in the federal
re´gime differ from the computations in the baseline model. The objective of
jurisdiction i is given by
Ti = ni[niτi + αnjτj + v(1− τi)].
In order to guarantee that no mobility occurs when the two jurisdictions
choose the same tax rate, we need to assume:
Assumption 6 Suppose that λκ(2α− v(1)) < 1.
Let τT be the unique solution to the equation:
1− v′(1− τT )− λκ(2τT + v(1− τT ))(v′(1− τT )− (1− α)) = 0. (20)
Proposition 6 In the quasi-linear, uniform model with arbitrary spillovers
when jurisdictions maximize total utility, the taxation game admits a unique
pure strategy symmetric equilibrium, where both jurisdictions choose the tax
level τT . Furthermore, the level of public good provided is lower than if
jurisdictions maximize resident utility, τT < τˆ .
Proposition 6 characterizes the unique pure strategy equilibrium of the
taxation game when jurisdictions care about total utility. As in the baseline
model, we show that the game always admits a pure strategy equilibrium.
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Compared to the situation where jurisdictions care about resident utility,
the jurisdictions’ incentive to attract new residents increases, resulting in
higher competition and a lower level of public good in equilibrium. An in-
crease in mobility reduces the equilibrium level of public good provision.
As in the public good game, an increase in the spillover parameter has a
nonambiguous effect and results in a decrease in public good provision, so
that centralization becomes preferable when spillovers are high.
Consider next the optimal choice of the majority jurisdiction in the fed-
eral re´gime. If the majority jurisdiction chooses a tax rate τ o, the migration
flow of agents from the minority to the majority jurisdiction is given by:
x = λκ(2τ o)(1− α)
so that total utility of the majority jurisdiction is
T = (2τ o + v(1− τ o))(1 + λκ2τ o(1− α)), (21)
Contrary to the case of resident utility, the total utility is not necessarily
concave in τ o. In order to guarantee concavity, we put an upper bound on
the size of the mobile population:
Assumption 7 Assume that v′′(1−τ)+2λκ(1−α)(4−3v′(1−τ)+2τv′′(1−
τ)) < 0 for all τ ∈ [0, 1].
Under assumption 7, the optimal tax rate τ o is uniquely defined as the
solution to the equation:
2− v′(1− τ) + 2λκ(1− α)(4τ − 2v′(1− τ)τ + v(1− τ)) = 0. (22)
Hence, contrary to the case of resident utility, the optimal tax rate τ o is
strictly increasing in the mobility parameter λ. As agents are more mobile,
the majority jurisdiction has an incentive to increase the tax rate in order to
increase the migration flow into the majority jurisdiction. Average resident
utility is given by
WC = (1 + α)τ o + v(1− τ o) + 2λκτ o2(1− α)2.
An increase in the mobility parameter λ thus affects the average welfare
through two channels: it increases mobility to the majority jurisdiction (a
positive effect) and raises the optimal tax level τ o (an effect which can either
be positive or negative). Notice however that
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∂WC
∂λ
=
∂τ o
∂λ
(1 + α− v′(1− τ o) + 2λκτ o(1− α)2) + 4κτ o2(1− α)2,
= (1− α)(∂τ
o
∂λ
(1− 2λκ(2(1 + α)τ o − 2v′(1− τ o)τ o + v(1− τ o)))
+4κτ o2(1− α)).
Hence, if 2λκ(2(1+α)+v(1)) < 1, ∂W
C
∂λ > 0. We conclude that, whenever the
share of the mobile population is small enough, an increase in the mobility
parameter λ results in an increase in the welfare in the centralized re´gime,
so that the result of Proposition 4 continues to hold.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies how Oates’ trade-off between centralized and decentral-
ized public good provision is affected by changes in households’ mobility.
We show that an increase in household mobility favors centralization, as it
increases competition between jurisdictions in the decentralized re´gime and
accelerates migration to the majority jurisdiction in the centralized re´gime.
Hence, decentralized provision only dominates centralized provision for low
values of spillover and mobility. Our main result is obtained in a base-
line model where jurisdictions first choose taxes, and households move in
response to tax levels. We consider two other variants of the model. If ju-
risdictions choose public goods rather than tax rates, the equilibrium level
of public good provision is lower, and mobility again favors centralization.
If jurisdictions maximize total utility rather than resident utility, the equi-
librium level of public good provision again decreases, and mobility favors
centralization when the size of the mobile population is bounded.
The theoretical results we obtain are seemingly at odds with a recent
trend of increased household mobility and increased fiscal decentralization.
This suggests that our model is not rich enough to capture the political
aspects of devolution of public services to local governments. We thus believe
that an important next step in our research program is to enrich the model
of the political process of public good provision and taxation, in order to
bring our theory to the data. In addition, we believe that our current model,
where all agents have identical preferences, may be too simplistic to capture
the effects of jurisdiction formation and migration. We plan to introduce
heterogenous preferences in the model, in order to emphasize the sorting
effect of migrations, and obtain a richer and more realistic model of fiscal
decentralization.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We first prove that (τ∗, τ∗) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the
taxation game. Suppose that jurisdiction 2 chooses τ∗. Consider first a
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choice τ1 > τ
∗. Let x be the marginal member of jurisdiction 1 who moves
to jurisdiction 2. Let G be the total amount of public good provided. Simple
computations show that
∂x
∂τ1
=
Ue(G, 1− τ1) + (Ug(G, 1− τ∗)− Ug(G, 1− τ1))(1− λF (x))
1 + λf(x)(τ1 − τ∗)(Ug(G, 1− τ∗)− Ug(G, 1− τ1)) .
As Uge > 0, Ug(G, 1 − τ∗) > Ug(G, 1 − τ1) so that ∂x∂τ1 > 0: an increase
in the tax rate τ1 unambiguously increases the migration of agents out of
jurisdiction 1. Now, compute the effect of an increase in τ1 on the resident
utility of an agent in jurisdiction 1:
∂U1
∂τ1
= (1− λF (x))Ug(τ1(1− λF (x)) + τ∗(1 + λF (x)), 1− τ1)
−Ue(τ1(1− λF (x)) + τ∗(1 + λF (x)), 1− τ1)
−λf(x)(τ1 − τ∗)Ug(τ1(1− λF (x)) + τ∗(1 + λF (x)), 1− τ1) ∂x
∂τ1
.
Now,
Ug(τ1(1− λF (x)) + τ∗(1 + λF (x)), 1− τ1) < Ug(τ1 + τ∗, 1− τ1)
< Ug(2τ
∗, 1− τ∗),
and
Ue(τ1(1− λF (x)) + τ∗(1 + λF (x)), 1− τ1) > Ue(2τ∗, 1− τ1)
> Ue(2τ
∗, 1− τ∗),
so that
∂U1
∂τ1
< −λUgF (x) + f(x)(τ1 − τ∗) ∂x
∂τ1
< 0.
Next, consider a deviation to τ1 < τ
∗. Let y be the marginal agent of
jurisdiction 2 who moves to jurisdiction 1 (with y < K). We easily compute:
∂y
∂τ1
= −Ue(G, 1− τ1) + (Ug(G, 1− τ
∗)− Ug(G, 1− τ1))(1 + λF (y))
1 + λf(y)(τ∗ − τ1)(Ug(G, 1− τ1)− Ug(G, 1− τ∗)) .
Notice that, as Ug(G, 1−τ∗) < Ug(G, 1−τ1), it is now impossible to sign the
effect of an increase in the tax rate on migrations (unless the utility function
is additive and Uge = 0, in which case
∂y
∂τ1
< 0, as expected.) However, we
compute:
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∂U1
∂τ1
= (1 + λF (y))Ug − Ue − λf(y)(τ∗ − τ1)Ug ∂y
∂τ1
.
After rearranging, we observe that the sign of ∂U1∂τ1 is the same as the sign
of:
A = λf(y)(τ∗ − τ1)Ue(G, 1− τ1)Ug(G, 1− τ∗) + Ug(G, 1− τ1)
−Ue(G, 1− τ1) + λF (y)Ug(G, 1− τ1).
Next, note that, as G < 2τ∗, Ug(G, 1−τ1) > Ug(2τ∗, 1−τ1) > Ug(2τ∗, 1−τ∗)
and Ue(G, 1− τ1) < Ue(2τ∗, 1− τ1) < Ue(2τ∗, 1− τ∗), establishing that
∂U1
∂τ1
> 0,
so that (τ∗, τ∗) is a symmetric equilibrium of the game.
We now show that there cannot be any other symmetric equilibrium. If
τ1 ≥ τ2, we compute the marginal utility of a change in τ1 as:
∂U1
∂τ1
= (1− λF (x))Ug − Ue − (τ1 − τ2)λf(x)Ug ∂x
∂τ1
.
Symmetrically, when τ1 ≤ τ2, we compute:
∂U1
∂τ1
= (1 + λF (x))Ug − Ue + (τ1 − τ2)λf(x)Ug ∂x
∂τ1
.
Hence, letting τ1 converge to τ2, we have:
∂U1
∂τ1
|τ1 = τ2 = Ug(2τ2, 1− τ2)− Ue(2τ2, 1− τ2).
Hence, whenever τ2 < τ
∗, ∂U1∂τ1 |τ1 = τ2 > 0 and when τ2 > τ∗, ∂U1∂τ1 |τ1 = τ2 <
0. This shows that whenever τ 6= τ∗, there cannot be a pure strategy equi-
librium where τ is a best response to itself.
Proof of Proposition 2: We first verify that (τ∗, τ∗) is a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of the taxation game. As U(τ∗, 1 − τ∗) > U(τ, 1 − τ) for
any τ 6= τ∗, if the other jurisdiction charges τ∗, any deviation to another
tax rate τ induces a migration out of the jurisdiction, resulting in a utility
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U(τ(1− λF (x)), 1− τ) < U(τ, 1− τ) < U(τ∗, 1− τ∗).
Hence, when the other jurisdiction chooses tax rate τ∗, any deviation to
τ 6= τ∗ results in a loss of utility.
We now verify that (τ∗, τ∗) is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Suppose that jurisdiction 2 chooses τ2 6= τ∗ and compute
∂U1
∂τ1
|τ1=τ2 = Ug(τ2, 1− τ2)− U2(τ2, 1− τ2) + λf(0)τ2
∂y
∂τ1
|τ1=τ2 .
We compute:
∂y
∂τ1
|τ1=τ2 =
Ug(τ2, 1− τ2)− U2(τ2, 1− τ2)
1− 2λf(0)τ2Ug(τ2, 1− τ2) .
Under Assumption 1, whenever τ2 < τ
∗, ∂y∂τ1 |τ1=τ2 > 0 so that ∂U1∂τ1 |τ1=τ2 >
0, and whenever τ2 > τ
∗, ∂y∂τ1 |τ1=τ2 < 0 and ∂U1∂τ1 |τ1=τ2 < 0. This implies that
there cannot be any other symmetric equilibrium of the taxation game.
Proof of Proposition 3: We first show that (τˆ , τˆ) is a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of the taxation game. Suppose that jurisdiction 2 chooses
τ2 = τˆ .
Consider first a strategy τ1 ≤ τ , namely a choice τ1 so low that U1 < U2.
We show that this choice is dominated by choosing τ1 = τˆ . Different cases
have to be distinguished. First suppose that ατˆ < τ1. Then
U1 = τ1 + ατˆ + λκx(ατˆ − τ1) + v(1− τ1)
< τ1 + ατˆ + v(1− τ1)
< τˆ(1 + α) + v(1− τˆ)
where the last inequality is obtained because τ1 < τˆ < τ
∗, so any increase
in the tax rate increases τ + v(1− τ).
Next, suppose that τ1 ≤ ατˆ . Notice that φ(τ1) < φ(τˆ) so that
U1 = τ1(1− α) + v(1− τ1) + α(τ1 + τˆ) + λκx(ατˆ − τ1)
< τˆ(1− α) + v(1− τˆ) + α(τ1 + τˆ) + λκx(ατˆ − τ1)
= τˆ(1 + α) + v(1− τˆ) + α(τ1 − τˆ) + λκx(ατˆ − τ1).
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If α < λκx, as λκx < 1, τ1(α − λκx) − ατˆ(1 − λκx) < 0. If α ≥ λκx, as
τ1 ≤ ατˆ ,
τ1(α− λκx)− ατˆ(1− λκx) < α(α− 1)τˆ
< 0
proving that choosing τ1 is dominated by choosing τˆ .
Next consider values of τ1 > τ such that (i) either τ < τ1 < τˆ and
U1 > U2 so that x < 0, or (ii) τ1 > τˆ and U2 > U1, so that x > 0. We will
show that ∂U1∂τ1 > 0 for all τ1 < τˆ and
∂U1
∂τ1
< 0 for all τ > τˆ . Using equation
(15), we compute:
∂x
∂τ1
=
v′(1− τ1)− (1− α)(1− λκx)
1− λκ(1− α)(τ1 + τˆ) .
and
∂U1
∂τ1
= (1− λκx)− v′(1− τ1)− λκ(τ1 − ατˆ) ∂x
∂τ1
.
Replacing, the sign of ∂U1∂τ1 is the same as the sign of:
B = (1− λκx)− v′(1− τ1)− λκ(1− α)(1− λκx)(1− α)τˆ
+ λκv′(1− τ1)(τˆ − ατ1).
We now separate the two cases (i) τ1 < τˆ and (ii) τ1 > τˆ .
If τ1 < τˆ and x < 0, as λκ(1− α)2τˆ < 2λκ(1− α) < 1,
(1− λκx)(1− λκ(1− α)2τˆ) > (1− λκ(1− α)2τˆ),
Furthermore, as τˆ > τ1 and λκτˆ(1− α) < 1,
−v′(1− τ1)(1− λκτˆ − ατ1) > −v′(1− τ1)(1− λκ(1− α)τˆ)
> −v′(1− τˆ)(1− λκ(1− α)τˆ)
And using the definition of τˆ , we finally obtain:
B > 0,
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so that choosing τˆ dominates any choice τ1 ∈ (τ , τˆ).
If now τ1 > τˆ and x > 0, we obtain in a symmetric fashion:
(1− λκx)(1− λκ(1− α)2τˆ) < (1− λκ(1− α)2τˆ),
−v′(1− τ1)(1− λκτˆ − ατ1) < −v′(1− τˆ)(1− λκ(1− α)τˆ)
so that
B < 0,
completing the proof that τˆ is the unique best response when the other
jurisdiction chooses τˆ .
In order to prove that there is no other symmetric equilibrium in the
game, we compute
∂U1
∂τ1
|τ1=τ2=τ = (1− v′(1− τ))(1− λκτ(1− α))− α(1− α)λκ τ.
Note that, when τ > τ∗, ∂U1∂τ1 |τ1=τ2=τ < 0. It is easy to check that, when
τ < τ∗, ∂
2U1
∂τ21
< 0, so that ∂U1∂τ1 |τ1=τ2=τ > 0 for all τ < τˆ and ∂U1∂τ1 |τ1=τ2=τ < 0
for all τ > τˆ . Hence, there cannot be any equilibrium at τ 6= τˆ .
Proof of Proposition 5: We first show that Equation (19) admits a unique
solution gˆ. Differentiating the equation with respect to g, we find:
Φ′(g) ≡ v′′(1− g)(1− λκgv′(1− g))− λκv′(1− g)(1− v′(1− g))
+ + λκgv′′(1− g)(1− v′(1− g)) + αv′′(1− g)λκg − αv′(1− g)λκ
< 0.
Now suppose that (g, g) is a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium of the
public good game, then ∂U1∂g1 |g1=g2=g = 0. Now,
∂U1
∂g1
|g1=g2=g = 1− v′(1− g)(1− gλκ
∂x
∂g1
).
and
∂x
∂g1
|g1=g2=g =
1− α− v′(1− g)
1− 2λκgv′(1− g) .
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Hence, we obtain:
∂U1
∂g1
|g1=g2=g = (1− λκgv′(1− g))(1− v′(1− g))− αgλκv′(1− g).
Now notice that, for any α > 0, as v′(1− τˆ) > 1− α,
Ψ(τ) ≡ (1− v′(1− τ)(1− λκτ(1− α))− α(1− α)λκτ
> (1− v′(1− τ)(1− λκτ(1− v′(1− τ))− α(1− v′(1− τ)λκτ
= Φ(τ)
Hence, as Φ(g) is decreasing in g, and Φ(gˆ) = 0 > Φ(τˆ), we conclude that
gˆ < τˆ .
Proof of Proposition 6: We first observe that equation (20) has a unique
solution as
χ′(τ) ≡ v′′(1− τ)(1− 2αλκτ + λκv(1− τ))
+ v′(1− τ)(v′(1− τ − 1− α)
< 0.
where we make use of Assumption 6 to sign (1− 2αλκτ + λκv(1− τ)).
Next, we prove that, when the other jurisdiction chooses τT , the unique
best response is to choose τT . Consider first the choice τ1 < τ . As in the
proof of Proposition 3, the resident utility is lower than if the jurisdiction
chose τ1 = τ
T . (The only steps which are need to prove this statement are
τ˜ < τT < τ∗, which is immediately obtained from the definition of τT .) In
addition, as n(τ1, τ
T ) < n(τT , τT ) = 1, total utility is higher at τT .
Next, consider a choice τ1 > τ
∗ > τT . Notice that ∂x∂τ1 > 0 for all
τ1 > τ
T , so that
U1(τ1, τ
T ) = τ1(1− λκx(τ1)) + α(1 + λκx(τ1))τT + v(1− τ1)
< τ∗(1− λκx(τ∗)) + α(1 + λκx(τ∗))τT + v(1− τ∗)
where the last inequality derives from the fact that τ1 + v(1 − τ1) < τ∗ +
v(1− τ∗) and x(τ1) > x(τ∗).
Now, consider τ1 ∈ (τ , τ∗). Compute
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∂T1
∂τ1
= (1− λκx)((1− λκx)− v′(1− τ1)− λκ(τ1 − ατT )) ∂x
∂τ1
− λκ ∂x
∂τ1
(τ1(1− λκx) + ατT (1 + λκx) + v(1− τ1)).
The sign of ∂T1∂τ1 is thus identical to the sign of
C = −λκ(2τ1(1− λκx) + 2ατTλκx+ v(1− τ1))(v′(1− τ1)− (1− α)(1− λκx))
+ (1− λκx)(1− λκx− v′(1− τ1))(1− λ(1− α)(τ1 − τT ).
Suppose that τ1 < τ
T and x < 0. Then
(1− λκx)(1− λκx− v′(1− τ1))(1− λ(1− α)(τ1 − τT ) > (1− v′(1− τT )).
In addition
v′(1− τ1)− (1− α)(1− λκx) < v′(1− τT )− (1− α).
Finally, as 2λκx < 1, and τ1 + v(1− τ1) < τT + v(1− τT ),
τ1 + τ1(1− 2λκx) + 2ατTλκx+ v(1− τ1) < 2τT + v(1− τT ).
So that, finally,
C > 0.
Similarly, when τT < τ1 < τ
∗, we have
(1− λκx)(1− λκx− v′(1− τ1))(1− λ(1− α)(τ1 − τT ) < (1− v′(1− τT )),
v′(1− τ1)− (1− α)(1− λκx) > v′(1− τT )− (1− α),
τ1 + τ1(1− 2λκx) + 2ατTλκx+ v(1− τ1) > 2τT + v(1− τT )
so that
C < 0,
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completing the proof of the fact that (τT , τT ) is a pure strategy symmetric
Nash equilibrium of the taxation game when jurisdictions maximize total
utility.
To check that (τT , τT ) is the unique pure strategy symmetric equilib-
rium, we compute:
∂T1
∂τ1
|τ1 = τ2 = τ = ((1− v′(1− τ))− λκ(2τ + v(1− τ))(v′(1− τ)− (1− α))
≡ χ(τ)
so that the only point at which ∂T1∂τ1 |τ1 = τ2 = τ = 0 is when τ = τT .
In order to prove that τT < τˆ , we notice that, as ∂T1∂τ1 |τ1=τ2=τ < ∂U1∂τ1 |τ1=τ2=τ ,
χ(τˆ) < 0 = χ(τT ). As χ(·) is decreasing, this implies that τT < τˆ .
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Figure 6: Centralization vs decentralization
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